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Abstract
We evaluate machine comprehension models’
robustness to noise and adversarial attacks by
performing novel perturbations at the charac-
ter, word, and sentence level. We experi-
ment with different amounts of perturbations
to examine model confidence and misclassifi-
cation rate, and contrast model performance in
adversarial training with different embedding
types on two benchmark datasets. We demon-
strate improving model performance with en-
sembling. Finally, we analyze factors that ef-
fect model behavior under adversarial training
and develop a model to predict model errors
during adversarial attacks.
1 Introduction
Deep neural models have recently gained popular-
ity, leading to significant improvements in many
language understanding and modeling tasks, includ-
ing machine translation, language modeling, syn-
tactic parsing, and machine comprehension (Gold-
berg, 2017). However, the NLP community still
lacks in-depth understanding of how these models
work and what kind of linguistic information is
actually captured by neural networks (Feng et al.,
2018). Evaluating model robustness to manipulated
inputs and analyzing model behavior during adver-
sarial attacks can provide deeper insights into how
much language understanding neural models actu-
ally have. Moreover, as has been widely discussed,
neural models should be optimized not only for task
performance but also for other important criteria
such as reliability, fairness, explainability, and in-
terpretability (Lipton, 2018; Doshi-Velez and Kim,
2017; Ribeiro et al., 2016; Goodman and Flaxman,
2017; Hohman et al., 2018).
In this work, we evaluate neural models’ ro-
bustness on machine comprehension (MC), a task
designed to measure a system’s understanding of
text. In this task, given a context paragraph and
Context: One of the most famous people born in War-
saw was Maria Skłodowska-Curie, who achieved inter-
national recognition for her research on radioactivity and
was the first female recipient of the Nobel Prize.
Question: What was Maria Curie the first female recipi-
ent of?
Answer: Nobel Prize
Table 1: Example MC question from SQuAD.
a question, the machine is tasked to provide an
answer. We focus on span-based MC, where the
model selects a single contiguous span of tokens
in the context as the answer (Tab. 1). We quantita-
tively measure when and how the model is robust to
manipulated inputs, when it generalizes well, and
when it is less susceptible to adversarial attacks.
Our novel contributions shed light on the follow-
ing research questions:
• Which embeddings are more susceptible to
noise and adversarial attacks?
• What types of text perturbation lead to the
most high-confidence misclassifications?
• How does the amount of text perturbation ef-
fect model behavior?
• What factors explain model behavior under
perturbation?
• Are the above dataset-specific?
2 Background
There is much recent work on adversarial NLP,
surveyed in Belinkov and Glass (2019); Zhang et al.
(2019). To situate our work, we review relevant
research on the black-box adversarial setting, in
which one does not have access or information
about the model’s internals, only the model’s output
and its confidence about the answer.
In an adversarial setting, the adversary seeks to
mislead the model into producing an incorrect out-
put by slightly tweaking the input. Recent work has
explored input perturbations at different linguistic
levels: character, word, and sentence-level.
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Original The connection between macroscopic nonconservative forces and microscopic conservative forces is
described by detailed treatment with statistical mechanics.
Character The connection between macroscopic nonconservative forces and microscopic conservative forces is
described by detailed treatment with statistical mechanics.
Word The connection between macroscopic nonconservative forces and insects conservative troops is referred
by detailed treatment with statistical mechanics.
Sentence The link between macroscopic non-conservative forces and microscopic conservative forces is described
in detail by statistical mechanics.
Table 2: Examples of character, word and sentence-level perturbations (bold indicates perturbed text).
For character-level perturbations, researchers
have explored the effects of adding noise by ran-
domizing or swapping characters and examining its
effect on machine translation (MT) (Heigold et al.,
2018; Belinkov and Bisk, 2018), sentiment analy-
sis and spam detection Gao et al. (2018), and toxic
content detection Li et al. (2018). Eger et al. (2019)
replaced with similar looking symbols, and devel-
oped a system to replace characters with nearest
neighbors in visual embedding space. For word-
level perturbations, Alzantot et al. (2018) used a
genetic algorithm to replace words with contextu-
ally similar words, evaluating on sentiment analysis
and textual entailment. For sentence-level pertur-
bations, Iyyer et al. (2018) generated adversarial
paraphrases by controlling the syntax of sentences
and evaluating on sentiment analysis and textual en-
tailment tasks. Hu et al. (2019) found that augment-
ing the training data with paraphrases can improve
performance on natural language inference, ques-
tion answering, and MT. Niu and Bansal (2018)
use adversarial paraphrases for dialog models.
Other related work includes Zhao et al. (2018),
who generated natural looking adversarial exam-
ples for image classification, textual entailment,
and MT. Specifically for MC, Jia and Liang (2017)
added a distractor sentence to the end of the context,
and Ribeiro et al. (2018) extracted sentence pertur-
bation rules from paraphrases created by translat-
ing to and then from a foreign language and then
manually judged for semantic equivalence. They
experimented on MC, visual question answering,
and sentiment analysis.
Unlike earlier work, we empirically show how
neural model performance degrades under multiple
types of adversarial attacks by varying the amount
of perturbation, the type of perturbation, model
architecture and embeddings type, and the dataset
used for evaluation. Moreover, our deep analysis
examines factors that can explain neural model
behavior under these different types of attacks.
3 Experiments
We perform comprehensive adversarial training and
model evaluation for machine comprehension over
several dimensions: the amount of perturbation,
perturbation type, model and embedding variation,
and datasets.
3.1 Perturbation Type
We examine how changes to the context paragraph
(excluding the answer span) affect the model’s per-
formance using the following perturbations:
• Character-level. In computer security, this
is known as a homograph attack. These at-
tacks attacks have been investigated to identify
phishing and spam (Fu et al., 2006b,a; Liu and
Stamm, 2007) but to our knowledge have not
been applied in the NLP domain. We replace
25% of characters in the context paragraph
with deceptive Unicode characters1 that to a
human are indistinguishable from the original.
• Word-level. We randomly replace 25% of
the words in the context paragraph with their
nearest neighbor in the GLoVe (Pennington
et al., 2014) embedding space.2
• Sentence-level. We use Improved ParaBank
Rewriter (Hu et al., 2019), a machine trans-
lation approach for sentence paraphrasing, to
paraphrase sentences in the context paragraph.
We perform sentence tokenization, paraphrase
each sentence with the paraphraser, then re-
combine the sentences.
For character and word perturbations, we use
25% as this is where the performance curve in
Heigold et al. (2018) flattens out.3 Regardless of
1From https://www.unicode.org/Public/
security/12.1.0/intentional.txt
2Several alternative embedding techniques could be used to
find the nearest neighbors e.g., Word2Vec or FastText. We use
GLoVe for consistency with previous work (Li et al., 2018).
3Belinkov and Bisk (2018) perturbed text at 100% (every
word), while Heigold et al. (2018) experimented with 5–30%
perturbations.
the type of perturbation, we do not perturb the
context that contains the answer span, so that the
answer can always be found in the context unper-
turbed. Because paraphrasing is per sentence, we
only modify sentences that do not contain the an-
swer span. An example of each perturbation type
is shown in Tab. 2.
3.2 Amount of Perturbation
For each perturbation type, we experiment with
perturbing the training data at differing amounts.
All models are tested on fully perturbed test data.
• None: clean training data
• Half: perturb half the training examples
• Full: perturb the entire train set
• Both: append the entire perturbed data to the
entire clean data4
• Ens: ensemble model that relies on none, half
and full perturbed data; we rely on ensem-
ble voting and only include the word in the
predicted answer if any two models agree.
3.3 Model and Embedding
We experiment with several recent models and em-
beddings that have been state-of-the-art on machine
comprehension.
• BiDAF model with ELMo (Seo et al., 2017;
Peters et al., 2018). ELMo is a deep, con-
textualized, character-based word embedding
method using a bidirectional language model.
The Bi-Directional Attention Flow model is a
hierarchical model with embeddings at multi-
ple levels of granularity: character, word, and
paragraph. We use pre-trained ELMo embed-
dings in the BiDAF model implemented in
AllenNLP (Gardner et al., 2018).
• BERT (Devlin et al., 2019). BERT is an-
other contextualized embedding method that
uses Transformers (Vaswani et al., 2017). It is
trained to recover masked words in a sentence
as well as on a next-sentence prediction task.
The output layer of BERT is fed into a fully-
connected layer for the span classification task.
Pre-trained embeddings can be fine-tuned to
a specific task, and we use the Hugging-
face PyTorch-Transformers package, specifi-
cally bert-large-cased-whole-word-masking-
finetuned-squad model. We fine-tune for two
epochs in each experimental settings.
4This has twice the amount of data as other settings so is
not directly comparable, but many papers show that doing this
can improve a model’s performance.
3.4 Benchmark Datasets
We experiment on two benchmark MC datasets:
• SQuAD (Rajpurkar et al., 2016). The Stan-
ford Question Answering Dataset is a collec-
tion of over 100K crowdsourced question and
answer pairs. The context containing the an-
swer is taken from Wikipedia articles.
• TriviaQA (Joshi et al., 2017). A collection of
over 650K crowdsourced question and answer
pairs, where the context is from web data or
Wikipedia. The construction of the dataset
differs from SQuAD in that question answer
pairs were first constructed, then evidence was
found to support the answer. We utilize the
Wikipedia portion of TriviaQA, whose size
is comparable to SQuAD. To match the span-
based setting of SQuAD, we convert TriviaQA
to the SQuAD format using the scripts in the
official repo and remove answers without evi-
dence.
4 Results
Fig. 1 summarizes our findings on how model be-
havior changes under noisy perturbations and ad-
versarial attacks. Here, we briefly discuss how
perturbation type, perturbation amount, model, and
embeddings affect model misclassification rate. In
addition, we contrast model performance across
datasets and report how to mitigate model error
rate using ensembling. Detailed analyses are pre-
sented in Sec. 5. Key findings are italicized.
Perturbation type To assess whether perturba-
tions changed the meaning of the context, we ran a
human study on a random sample of 100 perturbed
contexts from SQuAD. We found (as expected) that
humans could not distinguish character-perturbed
text from the original. For word perturbations, the
meaning of the context remained in 65% of cases,
but annotators noted that sentences were often un-
grammatical. For sentence-level perturbations, the
meaning remained the same in 83% of cases.
For a model trained on clean data, character
perturbations affect the model the most, followed
by word perturbations, then paraphrases. To a ma-
chine, a single character perturbation results in a
completely different word; handling this type of
noise is important for a machine seeking to beat
human performance. Word perturbations are con-
text independent and can make the sentence un-
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Figure 1: Number of errors by perturbation type and amount of perturbation (higher = worse model performance,
or more successful attacks). Baseline indicates model errors whose training and testing data were not perturbed.
For cross-model/embedding comparison, compare (a) and (b). For cross-dataset comparison, compare (a) and (c).
The ens training setting is an ensemble of results from the none, half, and full settings.
(a) Across models and embedding (b) Across perturbation types
Figure 2: The effect of perturbation types and embeddings on model behavior measured as high vs. low confidence
misclassifications under adversarial attacks. More robust models should have less high-confidence misclassifica-
tions.
grammatical.5 Nevertheless, the context’s meaning
generally remains coherent. Paraphrase perturba-
tions are most ideal because they retain meaning
while allowing more drastic phrase and sentence
structure modifications. In Sec. 4.2, we present a
more successful adversarially targeted paraphras-
ing approach.
Perturbation amount Perturbed training data
improves the model’s performance for character
perturbations (1st column of Fig. 1a), likely due to
the models’ ability to handle unseen words: BiDAF
with ELMo utilizes character embeddings, while
BERT uses word pieces. Our results corroborate
Heigold et al. (2018)’s findings (though on a differ-
ent task) that without adversarial training, models
perform poorly on perturbed test data, but when
models are trained on perturbed data, the amount
of perturbed training data does not make much
5Future work will address this with language models.
difference. We do not see statistically significant
results for word and paraphrase perturbations (2nd
and 3rd columns in each heatmap in Fig. 1). We
conclude that perturbing 25% of the words and
the non-strategic paraphrasing approach were not
aggressive enough.
Model and embedding As shown in Fig. 1a and
b, the BERT model had less errors than the ELMO-
based model regardless of the perturbation type and
amount on SQuAD data. While the two models
are not directly comparable, our results indicate
that the BERT model is more robust to adversarial
attacks compared to ELMo.
Datasets Holding the model constant (Fig. 1b
and c), experiments on TriviaQA resulted in more
errors than SQuAD regardless of perturbation
amount and type, indicating that TriviaQA may
be a harder dataset for MC and may contain data
bias, discussed below.
Train Test Model Answer
none char here”
half char Orientalism
full char Orientalism
none word Orientalism
half word behaviourism identities
full word The discourse of Orientalism
none char Orientalism
half char . . . the East as a negative
full char Orientalism
Table 3: Example result from response ensembling un-
der the SQuAD ELMo setting. The question is “What
was used by the West to justify control over eastern ter-
ritories?” The answer is “Orientalism”, and in all three
settings, the ensemble was correct.
4.1 Adversarial Ensembles
Ensemble adversarial training has recently been
explored (Trame`r et al., 2018) as a way to ensure
robustness of ML models. For each perturbation
type, we present results ensembled from the none,
half, and full perturbed settings. We tokenize an-
swers from these three models and keep all tokens
that appear at least twice as the resulting answer
(Tab. 3). Even when all three model answers differ
(e.g. in the word perturbation case), ensembling
can often reconstruct the correct answer. Neverthe-
less, we find that this ensembling only helps for
TriviaQA, which has an overall higher error rate
(bottom row of each figure in Fig. 1).
4.2 Strategic Paraphrasing
We did not observe a large increase in errors with
paraphrase perturbations (Fig. 1), perhaps because
paraphrasing, unlike the char and word perturba-
tions, is not a deliberate attack on the sentence.
Here we experiment with a novel strategic para-
phrasing technique that targets specific words in
the context and then generates paraphrases that ex-
clude those words. We find the most important
words in the context by individually modifying
each word and obtaining the model’s prediction
and confidence, a process similar to Li et al. (2018).
Our modification consists of removing the word
and examining its effect on the model prediction.
The most important words are those which, when
removed, lower the model confidence of a correct
answer or increase confidence of an incorrect an-
swer. The Improved ParaBank Rewriter supports
constrained decoding, i.e. specifying positive and
negative constraints to force the system output to
include or exclude certain phrases. We specify the
top five important words in the context as negative
constraints to generate strategic paraphrases.6
We experimented on 1000 instances in the
SQuAD dev set as shown in Tab. 4. Our results
indicate that strategic paraphrasing with negative
constraints is a successful adversarial attack, low-
ering the F1-score from 89.96 to 84.55.
Analysis shows that many words in the question
are important and thus excluded from the para-
phrases. We also notice that paraphrasing can occa-
sionally turn an incorrect prediction into a correct
one. Perhaps paraphrasing makes the context eas-
ier to understand by removing distractor terms; we
leave this for future investigation.
4.3 Model Confidence
In a black-box setting, model confidence is one
of the only indications of the model’s inner work-
ings. The models we employed do not provide a
single confidence value; AllenNLP gives a prob-
ability that each word in the context is the start
and end span, while the BERT models only give
the probability for the start and end words. We
compute the model’s confidence using the normal-
ized entropy of the distribution across the context
words, where n is the number of context words,
and take the mean for both the start and end word:
1− Hn(s)+Hn(e)2 , where s and e are probability dis-
tributions for the start and end words, respectively.
Low entropy indicates certainty about the start/end
location. Since the BERT models only provide
probabilities for the start and end words, we approx-
imate the entropy by assuming a flat distribution,
dividing the remaining probability equally across
all other words in the context.
Comparing confidence across models (Fig. 2a),
the BERT model has lower confidence for misclas-
sifications, which is ideal. A model should not
be confident about errors. Fig. 2b compares confi-
dence across perturbation type. In the none train-
ing setting, character perturbations introduce the
most uncertainty compared to word or paraphrase
perturbations. This is expected, since character
perturbations result in unknown words. In the ad-
versarial training settings, word perturbations lead
to the highest number of high-confidence misclassi-
fications. Thus, to convincingly mislead the model
to be highly confident about errors, one should use
word perturbations.
6The number of constraints does not necessarily indicate
the number of words that are changed in the context.
Original Paragraph Strategic Paraphrase
. . . Veteran receiver Demaryius Thomas led the team
with 105 receptions for 1,304 yards and six touchdowns,
while Emmanuel Sanders caught 76 passes for 1,135
yards and six scores, while adding another 106 yards
returning punts.
. . . The veteran earman Demaryius Thomas was leading
a team of 1,304 yards and six touchdowns, while Em-
manuel Sanders caught 76 passes for 1,135 yards and six
scores while he added another 106 yards of punts back.
Question: Who led the Broncos with 105 receptions?
Answer: Demaryius Thomas (correct)→ Emmanuel Sanders (incorrect)
Table 4: Example of strategic paraphrasing: red indicates the important words, which were used as negative
constraints in the paraphrasing; blue indicates changed words in the paragraph.
5 Robustness Analysis
Here, we do a deeper dive into why models make
errors with noisy input. We investigate data charac-
teristics and their association with model errors by
utilizing CrossCheck (Arendt et al., 2020), a novel
interactive tool designed for neural model evalua-
tion. Unlike several recently developed tools for
analyzing NLP model errors (Agarwal et al., 2014;
Wu et al., 2019) and understanding ML model out-
puts (Lee et al., 2019; Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al.,
2018; Hohman et al., 2019), CrossCheck is de-
signed to allow rapid prototyping and cross-model
comparison to support comprehensive experimen-
tal setup. CrossCheck interfaces with Jupyter note-
books and supports custom interactive widgets such
as heatmaps and histograms grids.
5.1 The Effect of Question Type, Question
and Context Lengths
We examine if models make more errors on spe-
cific types of questions in adversarial training, i.e.,
some questions could just be easier that others. We
first examine question type:7 who, what, which,
when, where, why, how, and other. The majority of
SQuAD questions are what questions, while most
TriviaQA questions are other questions, perhaps
indicating more complex questions (Fig. 4a). We
see that models usually choose answers appropri-
ate for the question type; even if they are incorrect,
answers to when questions will be dates or time
word spans, and answers to how many questions
will be numbers. Fig. 4a presents key findings
on differences in model misclassifications between
two datasets given specific question types. On the
SQuAD dataset, the model finds certain question
types, e.g. when and how, easiest to answer regard-
less of the perturbation type. Responses to these
7Computed as the first word of the question. Many how
questions are how many or how much, rather than how in the
“in what manner” sense.
questions, which generally expect numeric answers,
are not greatly affected by perturbations. For Triv-
iaQA, in general we observe more errors across
question types compared to SQuAD, i.e. more er-
rors in what, which and who questions.
Regarding question length, SQuAD and Triv-
iaQA have similar distributions (Fig. 4b). Both
datasets have a mode answer length around 10
words; TriviaQA has a slightly longer tail in the
distribution. We did not find question length to im-
pact the error. Regarding context length, SQuAD
and TriviaQA have vastly differing context length
distributions (Fig. 4c), partly due to how the two
datasets were constructed (see Sec. 3.4 for details).
For both datasets, the error distribution mirrors the
context length distribution, and we did not find any
relation between model errors and context length.
5.2 The Effect of Answer Length
Our analysis shows that the length of the model’s
answer is a strong predictor of model error in the
adversarial setting: the longer the answer length,
the more likely it is to be incorrect. Fig. 3 plots
the proportion of correct to incorrect answers. We
notice a downward trend which is mostly consistent
across experimental settings. For both SQuAD
and TriviaQA, the models favored shorter answers,
which mirrors the data distribution.
5.3 The Effect of Complexity: Annotator
Agreement and Reading Level
Here, we examine the effect of task complexity
on model performance under adversarial training,
using inter-annotator agreement as a proxy for
question complexity and paragraph readability as a
proxy for context complexity.
Inter-annotator agreement represents a ques-
tion’s complexity: low agreement indicates that
annotators did not come to a consensus on the cor-
rect answer; thus the question may be difficult to
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aQA datasets.
answer. We examine SQuAD, whose questions
have one to six annotated answers. In Fig. 5, we
present inter-annotator agreement (human confi-
dence) plotted against model confidence over the
four training perturbation amounts, looking only
at the incorrect predictions. The setting is SQuAD
BERT with character perturbation. We observe
that the models are generally confident even when
the humans are not, which is noticeable across all
perturbation amounts. However, we see interesting
differences in model confidence in adversarial train-
ing: models trained in the none and half settings
have confidence ranging between 0 and 1 compared
to the models trained in full and both setting with
confidence above 0.8, indicating training with more
perturbed data leads to more confident models.
Data Correct Errors
SQuAD 12.9 13.0
TriviaQA 17.1 17.5
Table 5: Contrasting median readability scores for para-
graphs with and without errors across datasets.
To evaluate the effect of context complexity, we
use the Flesch-Kincaid reading level (Kincaid et al.,
1975) to measure readability. For questions the
model answered incorrectly, the median readability
score was slightly higher than the median score for
correct responses (Tab. 5), indicating that context
with higher reading level is harder for the model to
understand. TriviaQA contexts have higher reading
levels than SQuAD.
Embedding Pert. Majority F1 score
ELMo char 0.58 0.70 ± 0.003
ELMo word 0.54 0.56 ± 0.004
ELMo para 0.65 0.65 ± 0.008
BERT char 0.76 0.77 ± 0.008
BERT word 0.72 0.73 ± 0.006
BERT para 0.82 0.82 ± 0.006
Table 6: MC error prediction across both datasets, em-
bedding, and perturbation types. Majority denotes a
majority baseline.
6 Error Prediction Model
Our in-depth analysis reveals many insights on how
and why models make mistakes during adversar-
ial training. Using the characteristics we analyzed
above, we developed a binary classification model
to predict whether the answer would be an error,
given the model’s answer and attributes of the con-
text paragraph. We one-hot-encode categorical fea-
tures (training amount, perturbation type, question
type) and use other features (question length, con-
text length, answer length, readability) as is. For
each setting of embedding and perturbation type on
SQuAD, we train an XGBoost model with default
settings with 10-fold cross validation (shuffled).
We present the model’s average F1 scores
(Tab. 6) and feature importance as computed by
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the XGBoost model (Fig. 6). We see that perfor-
mance (micro F1) is better to slightly better than a
majority baseline (picking the most common class),
indicating that certain features are predictive of er-
rors. Specifically, we find that: (1) for character
perturbations, the fact that the training data is clean
is a strong predictor of errors; a model trained on
clean data is most disrupted by character perturba-
tions; (2) for word and paraphrase perturbations,
question types are important predictors of errors.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a comprehensive set of experiments
on machine comprehension neural models across
various dimensions: perturbation type, perturba-
tion amount, model and embedding type, and two
benchmark datasets, to understand and quantita-
tively measure model’s robustness and sensitivity
to noise and adversarial input. We demonstrated
that several perturbation methods, which do not
greatly alter a human’s comprehension of the text,
can drastically affect the model’s answers. Our
in-depth analysis sheds light on how and why the
models make errors in adversarial training, and
through our error prediction model, we discovered
features of the data that are strongly predictive of
when a model makes errors during adversarial at-
tacks with noisy inputs.
For future work, we see many avenues for exten-
sion. We plan to experiment with more aggressive
and more natural perturbations, and deeper coun-
terfactual evaluation (Pearl, 2019). While recent
research has made great strides in increasing model
performance on various NLP tasks, it is still not
clear what linguistic patterns these neural models
are learning, or whether they are learning language
at all (Mudrakarta et al., 2018).
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